МАТЕМАТИЧЕСКАЯ МОДЕЛЬ ПЛАНИРОВАНИЯ РЕЖИМОВ ЭЭС В РЫНОЧНЫХ УСЛОВИЯХ НА СРЕДНЕСРОЧНУЮ ПЕРСПЕКТИВУ

N.I. Aizenberg; S.I. Palamarchuk

doi:10.14529/power240102

Authors

N.I. Aizenberg Melentiev Energy Systems Institute, Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences
S.I. Palamarchuk Melentiev Energy Systems Institute, Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.14529/power240102

Keywords:

electric power market, mathematical model, optimality conditions, imperfect competition, equilibrium, nodal prices, electric power market, mathematical model, optimality conditions, imperfect competition, equilibrium, nodal prices

Abstract

The paper presents a mathematical model for scheduling the states of an electric power system (EPS) in the medium term, with a focus on the rules valid in the Russian electricity markets. Such a model is required because of the need to plan power flows considering the interests of consumers, including reliable power supply and minimum cost of purchasing electricity. Scheduling the power system states should take into account possible actions of suppliers seeking to maximize their profits under nodal pricing in the markets. In the proposed model, the scheduling horizon is divided into several time intervals, the problem is solved taking into account the balance constraints at the EPS nodes; limitations on generation, flows, and volumes of consumed energy resources. Market equilibrium is modeled simultaneously in several intervals, given the multiplicity and duration of interaction. The study involves an analysis of the approaches to solving the multi-interval problem of search for an equilibrium state. The results of medium-term scheduling are exemplified by a simplified scheme of a real-world electric power system.

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Author Biographies

N.I. Aizenberg , Melentiev Energy Systems Institute, Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences

Senior researcher, Doctor of Economics

S.I. Palamarchuk, Melentiev Energy Systems Institute, Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences

Principal researcher, Prof.,

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